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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES /STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action

under URCP 41(b). Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P. 1126, 1127 (Utah 1984) This issue
was preserved in Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss and (2) in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to
Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 207) and Memorandum
in Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 269).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the action against

Defendant Beth Quintana was barred by the statute of limitations. This is a legal
conclusion that the appellate court reviews for correctness. Quick Safe-THitch,
Inc. v. RSB Systems, L.C., 2000 UT 84, flO, 12 P.3d 577 This issue was preserved
in Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth Quintana's
Motion to Dismiss and (2) in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to Amend
and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 207) and Memorandum in Reply
to Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 269).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant Evergreen Products, Inc., a Utah
corporation, on December 17, 2001 (R. 1). As explained in the Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 53), the
action was for breach of written contract (Share Purchase Agreement). Plaintiffs
performance thereunder was memorialized by a series of checks, which started
March 22, 1996. Therefore, the statute of limitations was six (6) years. UCA § 7812-23(2)
The corporation was involuntarily dissolved prior to the filing of the action
(R. 233). Therefore, the action was also filed against the corporation's
shareholders and directors. The date of dissolution is unknown, but it had to be
after April 1, 1998, which is the date the corporation first became "delinquent."
(Id.) Plaintiff did not discover the fact of dissolution until October 18, 2001,
which is the date her counsel pulled online records about the corporation from the
Utah Division of Corporations (RR. 223, ^16-17^ 224, ffl2-3). Therefore, the
action was timely filed even if the 3-year limitation period in UCA § 78-12-27 is
applicable.
At the time the action was filed (December 17, 2001), Plaintiff had
Defendant Quintana's address as "Green Flower Court, 4570 South 860 East, Apt.
2

7, Murray UT 84107" (R. 222, ffi[7-8). However, Plaintiff did not have an address
for the other Defendants (Id. at ^J19). Plaintiff did not discover an address for the
other Defendants until January 15, 2002 (Id. atffl[19& 21). At the same time,
Plaintiff also identified an alternative "Apt. No. 10" for Ms. Quintana (Id. at ^[20).
Accordingly, Summons were issued and went out for service on all Defendants.
The Summons and Complaint to Defendant Quintana were returned (April
29, 2002) with the following statement: "After due search and diligent inquiry this
office has become reliably informed that the party being served in this case cannot
be located or will not voluntarily submit to service of process at the address(es)
indicated."1 The Summons and Complaint to Defendant Frederick G. Ninow were
likewise returned (R. 28).
In the meantime, Defendant Frederick P. Ninow was served (May 5, 2002).
He was named because the first in the series of payments (R. 17) was issued to
"Fred Ninow." Based on experience in another case (Liao v. Ninow a/k/a Fred
Ninow, Case No. 990908561), Defendant Ninow was known to go by the name,
"Fred Ninow."

1

Incorrectly stated to be "(April 22,2002)." (R. 225,16)
3

All of this was explained in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick P. Ninow (R. 15). However, the trial
court granted the Motion in a Minute Entry entered June 11, 2002 (R. 26).
At this point, Plaintiff had no good address for Defendants Quintana or
Ninow. To be sure, Plaintiff had the Summons to Defendant Quintana reissued
(March 26, 2004) with the statement ("check with Apartment Office)." This was
returned with the statement: "Defendant is unknown at this address, no
forwarding." (RR. 222, %99 225, fj)
When this happened, Plaintiff continued investigating by contacting
Defendant Quintana's ex-husband who continued living at the apartment complex.
However, he gave no information (R. 222,ffi[10-l1). Plaintiff considered serving
Defendant Quintana at church, but learned that she was going to church at different
locations (Id. atffl[12-13).
While pursuing this investigation, Plaintiff came up with an apartment
number (103) for Defendant Ninow (R. 223, f22). As shown by the records of the
trial court, service on Defendant Ninow was made May 15, 2004 (R. 28).
As stated above, Defendant Ninow filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims
Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 42). Even though the caption of the motion was
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limited to Defendant Ninow, it was evident that he made the motion on behalf of
Defendant Quintana. (R. 43,1fij3-4)2
On this basis, Plaintiff served a proposed Order requiring an answer from
Defendant Quintana (R. 72). Defendant Quintana objected (R. 69), and the trial
court sustained the objection by handwritten revision to the Order Denying Motion
to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 73). Once again, Plaintiff was
left without service on Defendant Quintana.
In the meantime, Plaintiff and Defendant Ninow proceeded to litigate the
action. On March 22, 2005, Plaintiff served a Discovery Plan and Case
Management Order. Defendant Ninow's response was a Request for Extension of
Time to Respond to Discovery Plan (R. 77).
In the Request for Extension, Defendant Ninow stated: "Defendant seeks
additional time of one month, to May 9, 2005, to obtain an attorney so that he can
be adequately represented." (R. 77) On April 19, 2005, the trial court entered an
Order Granting Extension of Time (R. 79). Plaintiff took no action when May 9,
2005 came and went.

2

Though the motion was filed pro se, it, along with all of the other papers filed by Defendant Ninow, appeared to be
attorney-drafted.
5

On May 18, 2005, Defendant Ninow filed a second Request for Extension of
Time (R. 84). In this one, Defendant Ninow stated: "Defendant has had a heart
attack and his health is such that he has not been able to meet with Legal Aid."
(Id.) There was no corroboration for this, and the trial court did not grant
Defendant Ninow's proposed Order Granting Extension of Time.
Plaintiff waited a few months and then served a Request for Entry of Case
Management Order (R.86). This time, there was no response. The Request was
simply returned, unopened. Defendant Ninow made no further attempt to
communicate with plaintiff or the trial court.
As a result, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions (R. 91). The motion was
returned, unopened with the statement that it had been "Refused." Based on this,
plaintiff filed a Notice re: Refusal of Service (R. 96). This was also returned,
unopened with the statement that it had been "Refused."
The Motion for Sanctions was granted March 16, 2006 (R. 98). Plaintiff
waited a while longer and filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (R. 100).
Default Judgment was entered August 8, 2006 (R. 108).
Shortly after, Plaintiff became aware of Defendant Ninow's death. Plaintiff
reluctantly determined, based on everything stated above, that Defendant Ninow5 s

6

funeral was the only way to effect personal service on Defendant Quintana (R.
222, TJ14). This was done October 10, 2006 (R. 110).
On October 30, 2006, Defendant Quintana filed a Request for Extension of
Time to Answer Complaint asking until November 30, 2006 (R. 113). On
November 30, 2006, Defendant Quintana filed her Answer (R. 117).
Defendant Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (by counsel) was filed the same
day she responded to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents (R.
127). These Requests were served March 19, 2007 (R. 123). However, Defendant
Quintana was given an open extension, and there was no objection to three (3)
month delay.
At no time, during the prior course of this action, did any party file
application under URCP 4(b) that the action be dismissed. The trial court took no
such action itself. In fact, at no time during the course of this action did the trial
court issue an order to show cause. It was obviously satisfied with the progress of
the case, at least, until Defendant Quintana raised the issue, for the first time, many
years after the fact.
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth
Quintana5 s Motion to Dismiss and (2) in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to
amend and Enlargement of Time to Service Summons (R. 207). As the Court can
7

see, this was accompanied by a Motion for Leave to Amend and Enlargement of
Time to Serve Summons (R. 205). Both were supported by Affidavits of Plaintiff
and her undersigned counsel (RR. 221, 224).
Defendant Quintana filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
amend and Reply in Support of Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (R.
238). The matter was finally submitted to the trial court (R. 273).
Without hearing, and in a Minute Entry, the trial court granted Defendant
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss, and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend
and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 275). It took a while, and
objections from Plaintiff, but on October 23, 2007, the trial court finally entered an
Amended [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to
Dismiss (R. 309).
On November 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal (R. 317).
However, the day before that, Defendant Quintana's counsel filed a Notice of
Withdrawal (R. 314). On February 15, 2008, Plaintiff had Defendant Quintana
served with a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel. The service was "Return to
Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward." However, it is
obvious that it was received.
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On March 4, 2008, Defendant Quintana wrote this Court, from the same
address to which the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel had been mailed, and
stated: "Be advised that in as much as I have not retained legal representation yet,
please forward all information and correspondence to: Beth Quintana, 764 South
800 East, #103, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts relevant to the issues presented for review have been stated in the
foregoing Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of

URCP 4(b), and never credited Plaintiffs substantial efforts to serve Defendant
Quintana and prosecute the action against the other Defendants. URCP 4(b) is not
self-executing. The 120-day service rule does not come into effect unless and until
some action is taken by the court or the parties. No action was taken by any of the
Defendants, or the trial court, until after Defendant Quintana was served. As it
turned out, the only way for Plaintiff to obtain personal service was at the funeral
of Defendant Quintana's father. There is some indication that Defendant Quintana
knew about the action, and Plaintiffs multiple efforts to serve her, but she took no
action herself during the time it took to get her served. This was something that
9

should have been factored into the trial court's decision, but was not. Plaintiff did
not fail to adequately prosecute this action, and the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing under URCP 41(b).
2.

The underlying action is for breach of written contract. Therefore, the

applicable statute of limitations is six years. UCA § 78-12-23(2) The trial court
ruled that the action is not for a penalty, forfeiture or liability imposed or created
by law. UCA § 78-12-27 Therefore, the 3-year statute of limitations does not
apply. Even if it did, Plaintiff did not "discover" the cause of action against
Defendant Quintana until October 18, 2001. No time for performance was
established in the Share Purchase Agreement. Therefore, a "reasonable" time must
be implied, which means that the action was filed within the 4-year statute of
limitations. UCA § 78-12-25 No matter how the action is viewed, it was timely
filed.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON AN
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF URCP 4(b), AND DID NOT
CREDIT THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS TO SERVE DEFENDANT
QUINTANA AND PROSECUTE THE ACTION AGAINST THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS.
Defendant Quintana9 s primary point has been that the 120-day service rule

in URCP 4(b) is "self-executing.55 However, the contrary can be seen from its
10

express language: "If the summons and the complaint are not timely served, the
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon
the court's own initiative" (emphasis added)
The question in Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1994) was
when a previously filed action "failed" for purpose of the savings statute, UCA
§ 78-12-40. Defendant claimed the action failed when plaintiff failed to serve the
summons and complaint within 120 days. However, the Court ruled that the action
did not fail until the court took action to dismiss it. This was because:
[F]ailure of a cause of action under Rule 4(b) is not automatic. As
Rule 4(b) states, dismissal of the cause of action after the time for
service of a summons has elapsed depends upon some action, namely,
the "application of any party or upon the court's own initiative." Utah
R. Civ. P. 4(b) In the case before us, such action was not taken until
January 27, 1992, when the court, apparently on its own initiative,
dismissed the complaint.
877 P.2d at 1261-62

In this case, there was no such action until after service of the Summons and
Complaint. By then, it was too late: "Thus, unless and until a cause of action is
dismissed, a party who fails to serve a summons in a timely fashion may preserve
the action under proper circumstances." 877 P.2d at 1262

11

Defendant Quintana cited some new authority in her Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend and Reply in Support of Defendant Beth
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss: Hunter v. Sunrise Title, 2004 UT 1. It was not
surprising that this case was dead last in Defendant Quintana's brief (RR. 255-56).
It has no bearing in this case.
The basis for the court's ruling was "formal dismissal" of co-defendants.
fl 1 In that case, plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, and on the
merits, of two of the three defendants. ^[4 It is obvious that if plaintiff had not
stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice and on the merits, the Court's restrictive
reading of URCP 4(b) would not have applied.
The reason for this is URCP 54(b), which was not mentioned in Defendant
Quintana's brief:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action,.. .and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
12

In Hunter v. Sunrise Title, the two dismissed defendants moved for
summary judgment, "which resulted in the dismissal of all but one of Hunter's
claims. Thereafter, Hunter settled the lone remaining claim against Benson and
RS West and agreed to dismiss his complaint against those two defendants only,
with prejudice and upon the merits. The district court then entered ^formal order
of dismissal on June 22, 2000." f4 (emphasis added) At this point, in the words of
URCP 54(b), the action was "terminated" against those defendants, and there was
nothing to which the saving provision in URCP 54(b) could apply.
This is simply not the case here. When the trial court granted dismissal of
Defendant Frederick P. Ninow, it was over Plaintiffs objection and without
stipulation. Therefore, the action was not terminated against the remaining
Defendants. Indeed, the trial court's determination on this issue was "subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all parties." URCP 54(b) As a result, there was no basis
in this case for the Hunter court's strained interpretation of URCP 4(b).
In Plaintiffs view, the action was preserved by service of the other
Defendants, which first occurred within months of the filing of the action (May 5,
2002). As a result, nothing would have been served by requiring Plaintiffs
application under 4(b) for an enlargement of time. However, to be safe, Plaintiff
13

made such an application at the same time she responded to Defendant Quintana's
Motion to Dismiss. Under the circumstances, as shown above, there was "good
cause" for such an application. There was certainly no basis for dismissal under
URCP 4(b).
Over the years, Plaintiff made three separate attempts to serve Defendant
Quintana. The first two were at the address she claims was known to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff went so tar as to inquire of Defendant Quintana's ex-husband who was
still living at the apartment complex, but (perhaps, understandably) he would not
give any information as to her whereabouts.
After these attempts failed, Plaintiff considered serving Defendant Quintana
at church. Plaintiff fully investigated the matter, but learned that she did not go to
church in the same location. Therefore, Plaintiff abandoned those efforts.
This left serving Defendant Quintana at her father's funeral. Certainly, not a
preferred method, but the unavailing attempts left Plaintiff with no option.
Defendant Quintana argued, and the trial court (paradoxically) agreed that
Defendant Quintana could have been served by "other means." While there were
indications that Defendant Quintana had knowledge of the action and was avoiding
service, it is likely that the trial court would have denied service by other means.

14

After all, the trial court refused to treat Defendant Quintana as having
appeared in the action when her father expressly and formally acted on her behalf
(R. 73). The Court can search this record in vain for plain, undeniable evidence
that Defendant Quintana was avoiding service. There was certainly nothing that
would have satisfied URCP 4(d)(4)(A).
Plaintiff was satisfied that service by publication, or other means, would not
have reached Defendant Quintana. There was no indication that service by mail
would have reached her. Service by other means would not have served due
process or substantial justice. It is curious that Plaintiff should be penalized for
abiding by these constitutional imperatives.
As for the other Defendants, Plaintiff has explained everything that went
into the significant efforts to get them served and what went into prosecution of the
action against them. Those efforts were certainly more than minimal.
Defendant Quintana's principal case was Country Meadows Convalescent
Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993). The cases are
easily distinguishable. Plaintiff in that case did nothing for more than five years.
In response to a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, plaintiff finally filed a
motion for summary judgment.

15

Dismissal for failure to prosecute certainly made sense in that case, but it
does not here. There was never a time that Plaintiff was not pursuing the action. It
may be that Plaintiff was pursuing the action, at certain times, against other
Defendants, but this certainly made sense. Plaintiff hoped that judgment against
one Defendant would make prosecution of the rest of the action unnecessary.
More to the point, this is not a case where Plaintiff took action only in
response to action by one of the Defendants. Defendant Quintana's Motion to
Dismiss was in direct response to action that Plaintiff had taken, namely,
Defendant Quintana's personal service, which is something the court in Country
Meadows considered to be significant.3 The seriousness of Plaintiff s efforts is
evidenced by the fact that she persisted in her service efforts until they were
successful.
It is significant that at no time did the trial court ever issue an Order to Show
Cause. This is some proof that the trial court was satisfied with the progress of the
case. There was no basis for dismissal under URCP 41(b).
In sum, we commend the following as the best statement of Plaintiff s
position on the matter:

3

"Country Meadows, on the other hand, had made no attempt to reactivate its case prior to UDOH's dismissal
motion." 851 P.2d atl216 (emphasis added)

16

[I]t is appropriate to have in mind some established principles
applicable to such situations. It is not to be doubted that in order to
handle the business of the court with efficiency and expedition the
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion in
dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward
according to the rules and the directions of the court, without
justifiable excuse. But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable
and arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether there is
such justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more
factors than merely the length of time since the suit was filed. Some
consideration should be given to the conduct of both parties, and to
the opportunity each has had to move the case forward and what they
have done about it; and also what difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side; and most important, whether injustice
may result from the dismissal.
Applying those principles here, these observations are pertinent:
although there was unusual delay in getting this case to trial, this was
due in large part to the unusual circumstances delineated above.
Further, we are not impressed that the defendants themselves were
overly diligent or manifest any particular haste in getting the pretrial
discovery procedures completed and on with the trial. They did not
do so in responsive action to Westinghouse's having assembled
records, nor to the latterfs messages concerning their availability, nor
did they seek any assistance from the court.
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is
even more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the
existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard
and to do justice between them. In conformity with that principle the
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments
where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975)
17

II.

THE 6-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE.
The action against defendant Evergreen Products, Inc. was for breach of

written contract (Share Purchase Agreement). Actions on a written contract have a
6-year statute of limitations. UCA § 78-12-23(2) It was alleged that Defendant
Quintana is liable because the assets of the corporation were transferred to her and
that she continued the operations of the corporation after it was dissolved. Either
way, once the fact of personal liability is established, the basis for claim is the
same, and the director or shareholder is liable to the same extent as the
corporation.
The basis for the claim of personal liability is Grosjean v. Ross, 572 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1977) (creditor of subject corporation permitted recovery from
shareholder to whom assets of the corporation had been transferred); and Steenblik
v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995) (individual defendants held liable for
continuing the corporation's business after it had been administratively
suspended). There is nothing in either case indicating that the individual's liability
is different from the corporation's.
Defendants in Grosjean, supra, made the same argument here: UCA § 7812-27 bars this action because it was not filed within the 3-year limitation period.
18

However, the Court (citing American Theatre Co. v. Glassmann, 80 P.2d 922
(1938)) rejected this argument because the claim against the individual defendants
was not for a penalty, forfeiture or liability imposed or created by law.
Importantly, the trial court considered and rejected this very argument in the
case below. Defendant Frederick G. Ninow filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims
based on the 3-year statute of limitations in UCA § 78-12-27. However, for the
reasons stated above, the trial court denied the Motion. (R. 67) In doing so, the
trial court implicitly determined that the 6-year statute of limitations in UCA § 7812-23(2) was applicable in this case.
However, if the claim against Defendant Quintana is viewed on the basis of
UCA §§ 78-12-27, it cannot be barred. Plaintiff did not discover the basis for
Defendant Quintana's personal liability until October 18, 2001, Russell Packard
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,ffl[21-25,108 P.3d 741 (the "equitable
discovery rule"). This was well within the 3-year statute of limitations.
The trial court never addressed application of the "equitable discovery rule."
In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is true that determining when a plaintiff should reasonably have
discovered the facts sufficient to establish a cause of action and
whether a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances are both
fact-intensive inquiries that preclude judgment as a matter of law in
all but the clearest of cases. While these questions are usually left to
19

the trial court, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the
facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the
underlying facts or about the application of the governing legal
standard to the facts.
Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, ^}37, 144 P.3d
1129 (quotations, citations omitted)

Both Plaintiffs assignee and the undersigned counsel testified there was no
knowledge of the claim against Defendant Quintana until October 18, 2001. This
action was filed within a month (December 17, 2001). There was absolutely no
question about the application of the "equiptable discovery rule" to this case. No
matter how the case is viewed, it was timely filed.
Defendant Quintana also raised the 4-year statute of limitations in UCA §
78-12-25. However, there was no telling when default occurred under the Share
Purchase Agreement. The contract does not state a term for performance: "Money
is to be received as needed to help promote the growth of said company." (R. 182)
If the payments were a "loan," the date of repayment must be known to
determine if and when the statute of limitations has run. According to Defendant
Quintana, the statute of limitations started to run the date the payments were made,
but this made no sense whatsoever. Absent an express term, a reasonable term
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would be implied, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah
1998), and there is no way to know, on the basis of this record, what that time was.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Minute Entry (R. 275) and Order
Granting Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (R. 309) should be
VACATED and REVERSED.
DATED this

of March, 2008.
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC

VA^^cy^jiK^

By.
Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the within and
foregoing "Appellant's Opening Brief were mailed, First Class, postage prepaid,
this _\Ov^day of March, 2008, to:
Beth Quintana
764 South 800 East #103
Salt Lake City UT 84102

i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHING-PING LIAO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. 010911458

:

EVERGREEN PRODUCTS, INC.,
FREDERICK P. NINOW, FREDERICK G.
NINOW, BETH QUINTANA, DOES I-XX,

:
:

Defendants.

The Court
Plaintiff

:

has before

seeking

a

it a request

ruling

on

his

for

Motion

decision

for

Leave

filed by the
to Amend

and

Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons and Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion
to Dismiss.

The Court notes that the Plaintiff has requested oral

argument on the Motions. While the Motion to Dismiss is dispositive, the
Court determines that a hearing on this Motion is not necessary and would
not assist the Court because the issues have been clearly articulated by
the parties in their written submissions.
Specifically, while this matter has a convoluted procedural history,
the fact remains that the Complaint against the Defendants, including
Defendant Quintana, was filed in 2001 and she was not served until late
2006.

The Court

determines

that

the

Plaintiff's

failure

to serve

Defendant Quintana within the 120-day time period set forth in Rule 4(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to otherwise prosecute this

LIAO V. EVERGREEN PRODUCTS

PAGE 2

MIMUTE ENTRY

action against her for over five years is inexcusable.

Indeed, the

Plaintiff's assertions that he could not locate Defendant Quintana during
this time period are simply not credible, particularly since these
parties attended the same church and lived in the same apartment complex.
Moreover, if Defendant Quintana's whereabouts were indeed unknown to the
Plaintiff, then he should have sought to serve her by alternative means.
The fact that the Plaintiff did not do so underscores his failure to
diligently prosecute this action.
In addition to the Plaintiff's failure to timely serve and to
diligently prosecute his claims, which alone provide sufficient grounds
to dismiss this action, the Court also determines that the Plaintiff's
claims

are

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations.

Under

these

circumstances, an amendment of the Plaintiff's Complaint would be futile.
Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendant Quintana's Motion to
Dismiss is well-taken and therefore granted.

The Plaintiff's Motion for

Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons is denied.
Counsel for Defendant Quintana is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Minute Entry decision and on the detailed grounds for dismissal
(including specific citation to the applicable statute of limitations)

LIAO V. EVERGREEN PRODUCTS

MINUTE ENTRY
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discussed in its supporting and reply Memoranda.

Counsel is to submit

the Order to the Court for review and signature.
Dated this tj\J

day of August, 2007.

t=i
ROBERT

P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN (7372)
DAMON J. GEORGELAS (9751)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111
Attorneys for Beth Quintana

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 3 2007
'
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHING-PING LIAO,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED [PROPOSED] ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT BETH
QUINTANA'S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 010911458
EVERGREEN PRODUCTS, INC.,
FREDERICK P. NINOW, FREDERICK G.
NINOW, BETH QUINTANA, DOES I-XX,

Judge: Hon. Robert P. Faust
Oral Argument Requested

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendant Beth Quintana's ("Defendant")
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Ching-Ping Liao's ("Plaintiff' or "Ching-Ping") Motion for
Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons ("Motion to Amend"). On
September 6, 2007, the Court issued its Minute Entry Decision ("Decision"). In its Decision, the
Court GRANTED Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice and DENIED Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend.

1010087.1

Thus, based on all pleadings and admissible evidence submitted to the Court, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1.

The Complaint against Defendant Beth Quintana was filed in 2001. Ms.

Quintana, however, was not served until late 2006. Plaintiffs failure to serve Defendant within
the 120-day time period set forth in Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to
otherwise prosecute this action against her for over five years constitutes inexcusable delay,
especially considering that the parties lived in the same apartment complex and attended the
same church. The fact the Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant by one of the alternative means
available Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further evidences Plaintiffs
failure to diligently prosecute this action.
2.

Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any persuasive or legally excusable reason

why he has failed to take steps to move his claims against Defendant forward in the five years
since the Complaint was filed, such claims are dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of prosecution.
3.

In addition to Plaintiffs failure to timely serve and diligently prosecute his claim,

the Court also finds that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations found in Utah
Code. Ann. §§ 78-12-23, 78-12-25, 78-12-27, and/or 78-12-40.
4.

Accordingly, under these circumstances an amendment of Plaintiffs Complaint

would be futile and the Court herby dismisses Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice.

2
1010087 1

ORDER
1.

Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs

Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice; and
2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve

Summons is DENIED,
DATED this £ 3

day of O c 4 o ^ a p —
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

*

Donald L, Dalton
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2007,1 caused to be served by United
States mail, first-class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BETH QUINTANA'S MOTION TO
DISMISS, to:
Donald L. Dalton
DALTON & KELLEY

P.O. Box 58084
Salt Lake City, UT 84158
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